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Abstract
Recent monetary history has been characterized by monetary authorities which
have been, alternatively hard and soft on inflation. In a vintage capital framework,
investment decisions are not easily reversed. Therefore, expectations of policy as
well as current policy are important to the investment decision. Here, a vintage
capital model is used to assess the value of central bank credibility for a policy
change. Policy in this model is assumed to be private information of the central
banker. Agents learn about that policy which to study the ensuing transitional
dynamics following a change in monetary policy regime.
1. Introduction
The motivation for this study is threefold. The first of these is that many central
banks appear to alternate between distinct policy regimes associated with higher
and lower rates of monetary expansion. This is possibly a reflection of the central
bank’s attitudes towards inflation. The early eighties seem to be characterized
by much higher monetary growth rates - annualized rates of 6% to 8% - in the
U.S., in contrast to the middle to late nineties where money growth rates fell to
around a 2% annualized rate. A possible explanation is that money growth rates
reflect the values of the central bank. A low money growth regime places a higher
value on low inflation while a high money growth regime places a relatively lower
value on inflation.
Secondly, although inflationary expectations are difficult to measure, there is a
belief that inflationary expectations display a significant amount of ”sluggishness”
in the sense that they have a low contemporaneous correlation with current money
growth (Thiessan, 1996). This can be seen to the extent that nominal interest
rates reflect expectations of inflation. Changes in nominal interest rates tend
to lag changes in money growth. For example, Andolfatto and Gomme (1997)
show evidence of ”sticky expectations” by looking at monetary policy and interest
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rates in Canada from 1955 to 1995. In particular, they note that it took a
significant amount of time for nominal interest rates to rise during the ”loose
money” regime of the 1970’s and to fall during the ”loose money” regime of the
1980’s. A potential explanation for this behavior is that consumers observe the
current monetary authority and base their expectations of future money growth
and inflation on the past actions of that regime. Therefore, if a previously
”loose” central bank tries to take a hard stance against inflation, it takes a while
to establish credibility with consumers.
Finally, many economists agree that the empirical evidence supports the view
that unexpected increases in the growth of the money supply increase output and
employment and decrease nominal interest rates1. The reasoning behind this view
is that unexpected increases in money growth create two opposing effects. The
first of these is referred to as a liquidity effect : Unanticipated monetary expansions
create excess supply of loanable funds thus driving down the real interest rate.
The second effect assumes people believe that higher current money growth will
be followed by higher future money growth. This results in expectations of higher
future prices and causes borrowers and lenders to add an inflation premium to
1For a discussion of the empirical evidence, see the work by Friedman and Schwartz (1963),
Barro (1978), Barro and Rush (1980), King (1990)
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nominal interest rates. This anticipated inflation effect raises nominal interest
rates and depresses economic activity. The evidence supports the view that,
at least in the short run, the liquidity effect of a money shock dominates the
anticipated inflation effect.
The monetary transmission mechanism used here is a limited participation
model,as used by such authors as Lucas (1990), Fuerst (1990), and Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992) to generate the liquidity effect of a money shock. Limited par-
ticipation models assume that financial institutions are in continuous contact with
firms who borrow to finance either investment or labor expenditures. Households
save through deposits held by the financial intermediary, but cannot continuously
adjust their savings decision. The central bank conducts open market operations
directly with these financial institutions. In this framework, unexpected monetary
injections create ”excess liquidity” in the financial market. Consequentially, firms
are forced to absorb a disproportionately large share of the added money which
puts downward pressure on real interest rates and increases economic activity.
The two new features are the nature of capital accumulation and the formation
of expectations.
Evidence from plant level data show that capital accumulation doesn’t occur
smoothly and continuously, as standard neoclassical models imply. Instead, cap-
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ital accumulation is ”lumpy”, occurring all at once when old plants are replaced
with new ones. Doms and Dunne (1993) use a 12,000 plant study and find that,
over a 15 year period , 25% of a plant’s investment expenditures is concentrated
in a single year - 50% is concentrated in a contiguous 3 year period. This suggests
that a vintage capital model might be a more realistic view of capital accumu-
lation. Some of the earliest work on vintage capital was pioneered by Robert
Solow. In Solow (1962), capital had a fixed lifetime and the amount of labor in
a plant was fixed over its lifetime. Here, I employ a simplified version of Cooley,
Greenwood, and Yorukoglu (1997) . In this setup, the firm is able to efficiently
allocate labor over firms. A result of this is that older firms will employ less labor
than firms with newer technology. This is consistent with the observation that
older firms are smaller than newer firms.
For simplicity, it is assumed that there are only two regimes available to the
monetary authority. Changes between regimes will be purely exogenous. That
is, strategic interactions that might occur between the central bank and the gen-
eral public are ignored here. Expectations here will reflect slowly evolving beliefs
on money growth held by the public. Rather than perfect information environ-
ments where policy announcements are taken to be perfectly credible, here the
credibility of the monetary authority is determined by past behavior. Consumers
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make inferences as to the credibility of the policy announcement and gradually
update that belief through observations of money growth. Consequently, inflation
forecasts and hence nominal interest rates take time to adjust to regime switches,
thus exacerbating the effects of disinflation policy.
Several previous studies have looked at the relationships between monetary
policy, credibility, and beliefs. Backus and Driffill (1985a) look at the policy
game model of Barro and Gordon (1883). Central bankers are considered to be
either ”wet” or ”hard-nosed”. The public forms beliefs as to the true identity
of the central banker and updates those beliefs in a Bayesian fashion. They do
not, however, consider regime shifts. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) look at a
central bank with time dependant preferences over inflation and output. The
public can’t observe the preferences of the central bank, but make inferences by
observing money growth. Laxton, Ricketts, and Rose (1994) examine the rela-
tionship between regime shifts and imperfect credibility. They look at a model
that features expectations formed with a combination of backward-looking, least
squares learning, and Bayesian updating of beliefs about central bank credibility.
Their framework reveals relatively long periods of systematic errors in expecta-
tions, especially when there are regime changes.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: In section two, the economic environ-
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ment is outlined. The highlight of this section is the firm’s investment decision.
In standard models, the firm’s investment decision can be reversed in the next
period. Therefore, the first order condition for capital accumulation only involves
a one period forecast of the state of the world. Here, investment decisions are
irreversible for the lifetime of the capital Therefore, the forecast must be made
over the lifetime of capital. In section three, the model’s general equilibrium is
explicitly defined. Sections four and five describe the model’s balanced growth
path and detrend the model to render it stationary. In section six, the model is
calibrated to match salient features of the US. economy. Sections seven and eight
analyze the results of the model by exploring the impact of monetary shocks on
the model’s steady state and the transitional dynamics. The final section offers
some concluding remarks and directions for future research.
2. The Economic Environment
There exists a representative firm which operates a continuum of manufacturing
plants distributed over the unit interval. Plants are indexed by the age of the
capital. Capital has a lifetime of N periods after which it is scrapped. Therefore,
every period an age N plant is retired and must be replaced with a new plant.
The firm must decide how to allocate labor across plants as well as how much
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capital to install in a new plant. Once the capital is installed, it is in place until it
is retired in N periods. Capital goods become more productive over time, so as a
plant ages its capital becomes less productive relative to new capital. There is no
physical depreciation. Agents in the economy allocate time over labor and leisure
and income over cash and deposits. There is a financial intermediary that holds
deposits for consumers and loans money to the firm. The role of government is
to adjust the money supply via open market operations conducted directly with
the financial intermediary.
2.1. Beliefs
For simplicity, assume that there are only two choices for money growth. Let
the policy variable for money growth be eµt where eµt ∈ {µH , µL} where µH Â µL.
Therefore, µH can be considered a ”soft money” regime and µL a ”hard money”
regime. Monetary regimes switch back and forth between regimes according to
the following Markov process.
φij = Pr
n
µt = µj / µt−1 = µi
o
; i, j = L,H (2.1)
Let µt denote the realized rate of money growth at time t.Money supply grows
exogenously according to the following process.
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cµt = µt + εt (2.2)
where ε is a random disturbance drawn from the normal distribution.
fi (ε) =
1
σi
√
2π
exp
(
−ε2
2σ2i
)
; i = L,H (2.3)
Individuals in this economy can’t observe the true policy regime, eµ, that they
are currently in, but they can observe actual money growth and make inferences
about the current regime. Given the exogenous nature of money supply, the
only information that would be use for inferring regime type will be based on the
known parameters and on observation of the history of money growth.
Assume that individuals share a common initial prior for the probability that
the current regime is a hard money regime.
b0 = Pr {eµ = µL} (2.4)
Let the time t belief on the current regime, conditional on past money growth
be
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bt = Pr
nfµt = µL / µt, µt−1, ...o (2.5)
the probability that the current regime is a hard money regime, conditional
on the money growth history and the initial belief, b0. The individual enters
period t with belief bt, observes time t money growth, and then updates his beliefs
according to Bayes rule.
bt+1 =
gL
³
bt, µt, µt−1
´
gL
³
bt, µt, µt−1
´
+ gH
³
bt, µt, µt−1
´ (2.6)
where
gL
³
bt, µt, µt−1
´
= [btϕLL + (1− bt)ϕHL] f
³
µt − (1− ψ)µL − ψµt−1
´
gH
³
bt, µt, µt−1
´
= [btϕLH + (1− bt)ϕHH ] f
³
µt − (1− ψ)µH − ψµt−1 (´2.7)
Note that gL and gH involve two terms. The first is the probability that
the individual attaches to currently being in a low or high money growth regime
respectively. The second term represents the probability of observing the current
money growth given the belief of regime.
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It should be noted that learning will occur in this economy. Suppose that
an agent believes that the current regime is that of tight money (b is close to
one). If the true money regime is that of loose money, Bayesian updating implies
that the agent’s value of b will fall over time. For a long enough time period
with the money authority maintaining a loose money regime, the agents belief
will eventually fall to zero. The only exception to learning is if the agents initial
prior is exactly 1 or exactly zero.
Also, note that with incomplete information, the central banker has the ability
to fool the agents repeatedly. An agent could have the belief that a central banker
is a loose when he is actually tight. If the banker continually switches policy, he
can fool the agent indefinitely and complete learning will never occur.
2.2. The Representative Firm’s Problem
There exists firm that owns a continuum of manufacturing plants distributed
over the unit interval. A particular plant is identified by the age of the capital
employed. Let ψi denote the measure of age i plants. Capital has a life of N
years, after which it is unusable and, hence, has a value of zero. With a uniform
age distribution, ψi = 1/N. Therefore, every period, an age N plant is scrapped
and replaced by a new plant. The firm manager must decide the size of a new
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plant as well as how to allocate labor over the various plants. Consider an age i
plant. It has at its disposal ki efficiency units of capital and employs li units of
labor. It produces output according to the following technology
yi = k
α
i l
ω
i α+ ω ≤ 1 (2.8)
As in Greenwood, et al (1994), investment specific technological change is
formalized by the ability to produce capital goods more efficiently over time. Let
q represent the time t state of technology for producing capital goods. Let q grow
at the exogenous rate γq. This is the only source of real growth in the model.
k1t+1 = qtit (2.9)
Output can be used for consumption purposes or investment in new plants.
Therefore, the aggregate budget constraint can be written as follows.
ci + it =
NX
i=1
ψik
α
i l
ω
i (2.10)
The static decision facing the firm manager concerns the allocation of labor
across plants. Given ki efficiency units of capital and taking the price level and
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the nominal wage rate w as given, the plant manager maximizes plant profits.
Πi (ki, w) =max
li
{pkαi lωi − wli} (2.11)
The first order condition associated with this problem is
w = ωpkαi l
ω−1
i (2.12)
substituting this into (2.11) results in the profit function
Πi (ki, w) = p (1− ω) kαi lωi (2.13)
The dynamic decision facing the representative firm manager how much capital
to place in the new plants. The firm pays wages out all of current revenues, but
borrows from the financial intermediary at the nominal interest rate to finance
investment expenditures. Any profits are payed out as dividends. An alternate
setup would be to have the firm pay out a fraction of its profits as dividends
and use retained earnings to finance renovations, but the results would be similar.
Either way, the firm will incur an opportunity cost equal to the prevailing nominal
interest rate r. The setup here is chosen for simplicity. This decision is in line
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with the following dynamic programming problem. Note that primed variables
indicate time t+ 1 values.
V (k1, ..., kN ; s) =max
k
0
1
(
NX
i=1
ψiΠi (ki, w)− (1 + r)ψ1k0i +Et
(
V (0)
1 + r
))
(2.14)
subject to
k
0
i+1 = ki (2.15)
Equation (2.15) is the rule for capital accumulation. Age i capital today will
be age i + 1 capital tomorrow. The first order condition associated with this
problem is
(1 + r) qψ1 = Et
(
V1 (
0)
1 + r0
)
(2.16)
with
Vi (
0) = ψiΠi
³
k
0
i, w
0´+Et+1
(
Vi+1 (
00)
1 + r00
)
(2.17)
Equation (2.16) determines the amount of capital to be placed in a new plant.
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The cost of an extra unit of capital is (1 + r) q while the benefit is V1 (
0) / (1 + r)
represents the derivative of the value function with respect to k1. This can be
solved forward to yield
(1 + rt)ψ1 = Et
NX
i=1



iY
j=1
(1 + rt+j)
−1


ψiΠi1 (kt+i, wt+i) (2.18)
This expression states that today’s marginal cost of capital must equal the
present value of value marginal products over its lifetime. This is much different
from the standard first order condition for capital which only depends on the
marginal product one period forward.
2.3. The Representative Consumer’s Problem
Consumers have preferences defined over random streams of consumption and
leisure represented by the expected utility function
E0
∞X
t=0
βtW (ct, 1− lt) (2.19)
W (c, l;λ) = ln
Ã
c− λΘl
1+ν
1 + ν
!
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where c represents consumption , l represents labor, β ≺ 1 is the discount rate
and E0 represents the conditional expectation based on information available at
time 0. The form of the utility function is justified by Greenwood, Rogerson, and
Wright (1994) as being consistent with household production theory. The term
λ represents the state of technology in the household production sector. Further,
this form of utility allows the model’s steady state to be independent from the
distribution of wealth between the skilled and unskilled workers.
At the beginning of period t, the economy’s money supply is held by consumers
in the form of cash and deposits. One can think of cash as money held in a checking
account which earns zero interest and deposits as money held in a savings account
earning nominal interest rt Â 0. A key assumption is that the composition of an
individuals portfolio is made in the previous period. Although cash earns no
interest, it is required to purchase goods through the familiar cash in advance
constraint
ptct ≤ mct (2.20)
At the end of the period, households receive income from four sources: wage
income, interest earned on their savings, dividends from banks, and profits from
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the production firm.
ptyt = wtlt + (1 + rt)m
d
t +Π
b
t +Π
p
t (2.21)
Money income can be allocated for consumption purposes or can be saved.
Saved income is divided between a household’s checking account and savings ac-
counts
st =
³
mct+1 −mct
´
+
³
mdt+1 −mdt
´
(2.22)
Where mdt+1,m
c
t+1 ≥ 0 ( households can’t issue money ). Also, the household
faces the budget constraint
ptct + st = wtlt + (1 + rt)m
d
t +Π
b
t +Π
p
t (2.23)
the household’s decision problem is to choose a contingency plan forn
ct, , lt,m
c
t+1,m
d
t+1
o∞
t=0
that maximizes expected lifetime utility subject to the
series of constraints.
The unskilled workers problem can be written in the following recursive formu-
lation. Note that to save on notation, time subscripts have been left out. Primed
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variables indicate their t+1 values. s represents the state of the world which will
be defined later.
J
³
mc,md; s
´
= Max
c,l,mc0 ,md0



W (c, l) + βEtJ
³
mc0,md0; s0
´
+λ1


wl + (1 + r)md +Πb +Πpt
−mc0 −md0


+λ2 (m
c − pc)



(2.24)
The upshot of the dynamic programming problem are the following first order
conditions
W1 (c, l) = pλ2 (2.25)
−W2 (c, l) = wλ1 (2.26)
βEJ1
³
mc0,md0, s0
´
= λ1 (2.27)
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βEJ2
³
mc0,md0, s0
´
= λ1 (2.28)
Along with the following envelope conditions
J1
³
mc,md, s
´
= λ2 (2.29)
J2
³
mc,md, s
´
= (1 + r)λ1 (2.30)
Using the first order conditions along with the envelope conditions, the un-
skilled worker’s problem can be reduced to the following two efficiency conditions.
W2 (c, l)
w
= βE
(
W1 (c
0, l0)
p0
)
(2.31)
W2 (c, l)
w
= βE
(
(1 + r)
W2 (c
0, l0)
w0
)
(2.32)
Equation (2.31) is the efficiency condition for cash balances. On the left hand
side is the marginal cost of obtaining one unit of cash in terms of foregone leisure
time. That is, 1/w hours of work is required to earn one unit of cash. The
marginal disutility of labor W2 (c, l) converts the hours into utility. The left hand
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side of (2.31) is the expected benefit of the extra unit of cash in terms of the
expected utility of the consumption it can purchase. Equation (2.32) is the effi-
ciency condition for deposits. Deposits cannot be used for consumption, but can
be used to purchase the credit good in this economy - leisure. Therefore, the left
hand side of (2.32) is the marginal cost of obtaining an additional unit of deposits
while the left hand side is the marginal benefit of the leisure time that can be
purchased next period.
2.4. Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries collect deposits from skilled workers and unskilled work-
ers and loan the money out to firms. They also receive cash injections from the
government. Denoting cash transfers by τ , the financial intermediaries profits are
the difference between interest collected from the firm and interest paid out on
deposits to consumers and can be written as
Πb =
³
md + τ
´
(1 + r)−md (1 + r)
= (1 + r) τ (2.33)
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3. Equilibrium
The model is completed by a description of the state of the world. This is given
by the vector s = {k1, ..., kN , µt, bt,m} . Given the definition of the state, the
competitive equilibrium can be defined as a set of decision rules
n
c, l,mc0,md0, ki,
o
and a set of pricing functions {p, r, w} such that
1) Given their beliefs on the current policy regime, consumers optimize, taking
interest rates, wages, and prices as given, resulting in decisions for consumption,
labor, cash and deposits given by c, l,mc0,md0
2) Given its beliefs on the current policy regime, the representative firms and
all plants maximize profits taking interest rates, wages, and prices as given. The
resulting decisions are represented by k
0
1, li.
3) Beliefs are updated rationally using all available information via Bayes Rule.
4) Given the behavior of consumers and producers, prices adjust such that
markets clear, as represented by the following conditions
τ +md = pit (3.1)
c+ it =
NX
i=1
ψik
α
i l
γ
i (3.2)
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NX
i=1
ψili = l (3.3)
md0 +mc0 = m0 (3.4)
4. Balanced Growth
In this section the balanced growth properties of the model will be derived. This
will be needed when the economy is transformed into one where all the variables
are stationary. First of all, it is reasonable to assume that in the steady state, labor
supply is constant. The aggregate budget constraint implies that consumption,
investment, and output all grow at the same rate g.
Due to the increase in efficiency in producing capital goods, capital grows over
time at a rate faster than investment..
γk = gγq (4.1)
Given the production function, the growth of output can be calculated.
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γy = γ
α
k =
³
gγq
´α
(4.2)
g = γ
α
1−α
q (4.3)
Therefore, as the economy’s efficiency at producing capital goods grows over
time, the capital to output ratio rises over time. This is another fact documented
in Greenwood, et al (1994). Note that for labor supply to be constant in the
steady state, technology in the household production sector must grow at the
same rate as consumption.
γλ = γc (4.4)
Note that as the capital stock grows, the marginal value of capital for the
firm declines. However, so does the marginal cost of new capital in terms of
consumption.
With all the real variables accounted for, all that remains is to look at the
nominal variables. The money market clearing equation implies that the growth
of cash and deposit holdings by both skilled and unskilled workers equals the
growth in money supply. The cash in advance constraint then restricts the growth
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in the real value of cash holdings to equal the growth in consumption. It is then
straightforward to show that the growth in the price level.
γp =
γm
γc
(4.5)
where γm is the growth rate of money supply. Given the balanced growth
properties, the model is reduced to the following transformed equations. A hatted
variable represents the transformed analog to the variables given above.
4.1. Firms
Labor Demand
lit =
Ã
kˆjt
kˆ1t
! α
1−ω
l1t (4.6)
Capital Accumulation
(1 + rt)ψ1 =
Ã
γm
γk
!
Et
(
Vˆ1 (t+ 1)
(1 + rt+1)
)
Vˆi (t+ 1) = ψiΠˆk (t+ 1) +
Ã
γm
γk
!
Et+1
(
Vˆi+1 (t+ 2)
(1 + rt+2)
)
(4.7)
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Capital Accumulation ( for i=2,...,N)
γkkˆit+1 =
bki−1t (4.8)
4.2. Unskilled Workers
Cash Holdings
γmt
Θlνtµbct − Θl1+νt1+ν ¶ wˆt = βEt



1µbct+1 − Θl1+νt+11+ν ¶ pˆt+1



(4.9)
Deposit Holdings
γmt
Θlνtµbct − Θl1+νt1+ν ¶ wˆt = βEt



(1 + rt+1)µbct+1 − Θl1+νt+11+ν ¶ wˆt+1



(4.10)
Cash in Advance Constraint
mˆct ≥ pˆtcˆt (4.11)
Budget Constraint
pˆtcˆt + γmtmˆ
c
t+1 + γmtmˆ
d
t+1 = wˆtlt + (1 + rt) mˆ
d
t + Πˆ
b
t +
bΠpt (4.12)
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4.3. Financial Intermediary
Πˆbt = (1 + rt) bτ t (4.13)
4.4. Money Supply
Mt+1
Mt
= (1 + µmt) = γmt (4.14)
4.5. Market Clearing
Loan Market
bτ t + mˆdt = bit (4.15)
Goods Market
cˆt + bii = NX
i=1
ψikˆ
α
itl
ω
it (4.16)
Unskilled Labor Market
NX
i=1
ψilit = lt (4.17)
Money Market
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mˆdt + mˆ
c
t = 1 (4.18)
5. Calibration
The next step in the analysis is to choose values for the models parameters. The
values come from either a priori information or so that along the model’s balanced
growth path various endogenous variables assume the long run values seen in the
US. data.
technology: α ω γk
preferences: β ν Θ
policy: µL µH σL σH ψ ϕij
A time period is chosen to correspond to one year. Over the post war period,
labor’s share of income has averaged .65. This implies that ω = .65. The value
of 1/ν corresponds to a labor supply elasticity. Following Greenwood, Hercowitz
and Huffman (1988), a value of .6 was chosen. This implies a value of 1.7 for the
labor supply elasticity, which is an average found by earlier researchers.
The average growth rate of output per hour was 1.24 percent between 1954−90.
Thus, the model should satisfy the property
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γy = 1.0124 (5.1)
The average ratio of hours to non sleeping hours of the working age population
is .25. Therefore,
l = .25. (5.2)
The nominal interest rate is chosen to be 9%. Assuming a long run rate of
money growth of 5% yields the restriction for the discount rate.
γm
β
= 1.09 (5.3)
Using these restrictions implies the following parameter values
α = .2
ω = .65
γq = 1.06
β = .9633
ν = .6
Θ = .476
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The parameter estimates for the process governing money growth are taken
from Andolfatto and Gomme (1997) who estimated them via maximum likelihood
using Hamilton’s (1989) regime switching model to data on per capita money
growth for Canada over the sample period 1955:1 - 1996:1. The parameter esti-
mates are as follows.
parameter µL µH σL σH ϕLL ϕHH
estimate .04 .08 .0104 .0077 .9922 .9637
6. Disinflationary Policy
The experiment studied here is a permanent switch from high money growth
economy (µH = .08) to a low money growth economy (µL = .04). It should be
noted that the results are symmetric for switching from a low growth economy to
a high money growth. Since only permanent, non-stochastic policy experiments
are being considered,the switching probabilities in the Markov process governing
the monetary regime are set to zero. The main problem here is choosing an initial
prior for the beliefs of consumers. In Andolfatto and Gomme, the choice for the
initial prior was the steady state belief given that the switching process was as
described above. Here, the initial prior is chosen simply as a parameter. The
three experiments considered will be as follows. First, the governments announced
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policy of lower money growth is fully credible. This corresponds to b0 = 1 (the
public is certain that the economy is in a low money growth regime). In the second
experiment, the government doesn’t have perfect credibility, but credibility is still
high. In this experiment, the initial prior is set at .7 ( consumers believe that there
is a 70 percent chance that the monetary authority is committed to a low money
growth regime). Finally, in the last experiment, the government is assumed to
have low credibility. In this test, the initial prior is set at .2. Note that if the
government had no credibility, (b=0), then no learning takes place and the central
bank can ”fool” the public forever. The solution mechanism used here is that of
King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1987). The model is linearized around the steady
state. The system of difference equations characterizing the model’ s dynamics
has N+1 eigenvalues with modulus less than one. This corresponds to the model’s
N + 1 state variables k1, ..., kN and m
c. Therefore, the transition path is stable
and unique. The modification here is in the calculation of the dynamic transition
path that satisfies the transversality conditions. With complete information, the
conditional expectation of future money growth is calculated as follows.
E
h
µt+1/It
i
= µi +
Z
fH (εt+1) dεt+1 ; i = L,H (6.1)
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With incomplete, information, we must take into account the role of beliefs.
If consumers enter period t with belief bt, the expectation of future money growth
will be
E
h
µt+1/It
i
= (1− bt)
½eµH + Z fH (εt+1) dεt+1¾+ bt ½eµL + Z fL (εt+1) dεt+1¾
(6.2)
and the evolution of bt is given by
bt+1 =
btfL (εt)
btfL (εt) + (1− bt) fH (εt)
(6.3)
First off, it should be noted that expectations of future money growth (and,
hence, future inflation) don’t affect the optimality of new capital purchases di-
rectly. Take the first order condition for capital.
(1 + rt)ψ1qt = Et
NX
i=1



iY
j=1
(1 + rt+j)
−1


ψi (1− ω) pt+ik
α
it+il
ω
it+i (6.4)
Using this and the relationship between the real and nominal interest rate
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(1 + rt) = (1 + ert) (1 + πt) = (1 + ert)
Ã
pt+1
pt
!
(6.5)
It is easy to show that the right hand side of the efficiency condition for capital
is completely unaffected by money growth.
(1 + ert) (1 + πt)ψ1
Ã
qt
pt
!
= Et
NX
i=1



iY
j=1
(1 + ert+j)−1


ψi (1− ω) k
α
it+il
ω
it+i (6.6)
In fact, the only place that money growth is involved directly is the nominal
interest cost of capital expenditures. This is due to the fact that the firm must
repay the financing for capital in the same period that the purchase is made.
However, changes in money growth - particularly permanent changes - do affect
investment through labor supply and future capital purchases. As in Stockman
(1981), higher money growth (hence, higher inflation) has a negative impact on
the steady state capital through the inflation tax on capital investment. Further,
as in Cooley (1989), because workers can’t covert their wages into cash until the
following period, they pay an inflation tax as well. Therefore, higher money
growth has a negative impact on labor as well as capital.
In the first experiment with complete information, the liquidity effect of the
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decrease in money growth is very short lived. Figures 1.1-1.6 shows the dynamic
transition paths following the policy change. Capital investment initially falls, but
starts towards the new steady state one period following the shock. Investment
expenditures are above the old steady state by the sixth period following the
shock. Labor, output, and consumption fall for significantly longer (7 periods
following the shock) and take longer to surpass the old steady state (14 periods).
This is due to the fact that as investment expenditures remain below the steady
state, the aggregate capital stock continually falls. Its not until new investment
expenditures surpass the old steady state that the aggregate capital stock begins
to rise to its new level.
In the second experiment, the initial prior was set to .7. With imperfect infor-
mation, The effect on investment expenditures on impact is larger and the drop in
investment is more persistent. Figures 2.1-2.6 show the dynamic paths following
the drop in money growth. Investment falls for two periods and remains below
the old steady state for 9 periods. As a result, labor, output and consumption
fall for 9 periods and don’t surpass the old steady state for 16 periods. Beliefs
are plotted in figure 2.6. Notice that the public learns of the regime switch very
quickly. By period 7 , consumers place a 100% probability of being in the low
money growth state. This learning process could be slowed down by increasing
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the variance of the error term in money supply.
In the third experiment, the initial prior was set to .2. With poor credibility,
the public is ”fooled” by the central bank for a longer period of time. Figure
6 plots the evolution of beliefs with b0 = .2. With a lower initial starting value,
consumers take longer to become confidant that they are actually in a low money
growth state. In this case the liquidity effect dominates the anticipated inflation
effect for longer and the economy experiences a longer recession due to lack of
liquidity in the financial sector. Figures 3.1-3.6 show the transition paths. As in
the previous cases, on impact, the reduction in money supply initially creates a
shortage of loanable funds in the financial sector, reducing investment. Note that
the effect on impact is even bigger than in the previous two cases. Further, the
public is ”fooled” for a longer period. Figure 3.6 shows the evolution of beliefs.
With low credibility, it takes the public 10 periods to fully trust the monetary
authority.
7. Conclusions
Empirical evidence seems to support the premise that many central banks appear
to alternate between distinct policy regimes associated with higher and lower
rates of monetary expansion, possibly reflecting the attitude of the central banker
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towards inflation. Further, many economists agree that a shortage of liquidity
in financial markets due to unexpected decreases in money growth can drive up
real interest rates and depress economic activity. The question addressed here is
how a central bank’s credibility affects the short run dynamics following a regime
switch by the central bank. Earlier studies have shown that an unexpected regime
switch to a low money growth economy, while generating long run benefits, create
short run contractions.
Empirical studies at the microeconomic level show that plant level expendi-
tures do not adjust smoothly as the standard neoclassical framework suggests,
but are in fact ”lumpy”- occurring infrequently and in bursts. This suggests that
a model with vintage capital might be a more accurate representation of capi-
tal expenditures. Further, earlier authors have shown that technological progress
which is specific to investment goods is an important source of growth in the US.
economy. Prior studies of vintage capital economies have shown that the propa-
gation mechanism of capital accumulation following an exogenous shock is greatly
enhanced. The implication being that the welfare effects could be much larger
than previously believed.
I construct a vintage capital model where new technology is embodied in
new capital goods. The monetary transmission is introduced through a limited
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participation setup where monetary injections do not coincide with individual’s
savings decisions. The resulting excess liquidity in the financial sector acts to
drive down nominal interest rates and boost investment spending. Additionally,
it is assumed here that the public has imperfect information as to the current
policy regime. Therefore, they must learn from observations of money growth.
This learning is undertaken in a Bayesian fashion. Results show that when the
monetary regime has imperfect credibility with regard to regime switches, it takes
time for the general public to believe the monetary authority’s resolve. The
consequences are that a switch to an anti-inflationary regime can initially generate
a recession. Further, the less credibility a central bank has,or the less control the
central bank has over the money supply (a larger random error term in the money
supply process), the more prolonged is the contractionary period. Note that the
knife here cuts both ways. The monetary authority faces a trade off between
short run output effects and long run inflation effects. When the central banker
can ”fool” the general public, an unexpected switch to a higher money growth
can generate a long lived expansion. This suggests that the welfare implications
of monetary policy could be much larger that previously estimated.
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